Naval War College Review
Volume 58
Number 4 Autumn

Article 12

2005

Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror
Derek S. Reveron
Jason Burke

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Reveron, Derek S. and Burke, Jason (2005) "Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 4 , Article
12.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/12

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

146

Reveron and Burke: Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

between surprise, security, and the
American experience in the 21st
century.”
Gaddis closes with a poignant anecdote.
One of his Yale undergraduates “asked
in the dark and fearful days that followed September 11th, ‘Would it be OK
now for us to be patriotic?’ ” to which
he responds, “Yes, I think it would.” This
is a commentary both on the smug
self-indulgence of many elites during
America’s post–Cold War “vacation
from history” and on the uncomfortable “disconnection in our thinking between the security to which we’ve
become accustomed and the means by
which we obtained it.” It is intellectually fashionable in many venues today
to condemn the sometimes morally ambiguous policies that have nonetheless
brought us the national security we historically have taken for granted. But as
Gaddis notes: “The better approach, I
think, is to acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history. Like most other
nations, we got to where we are by
means that we cannot today, in their
entirety, comfortably endorse. Comfort
alone, however, cannot be the criterion
by which a nation shapes its strategy
and secures its safety. The means of
confronting danger do not disqualify
themselves from consideration solely
on the basis of the uneasiness they produce. Before we too quickly condemn
how our ancestors dealt with such
problems, therefore, we might well ask
ourselves two questions: What would
we have done if we had been in their
place then? And, even scarier, how
comfortable will our descendants be
with the choices we make today?”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 304pp. $24.95

As the United States enters its fifth year
in the war on terrorism, too little is
known about al-Qa‘ida. Though several
top al-Qa‘ida operatives, like Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, are now in custody, and detainee reporting from
Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Airbase, and
other locations provides a historical
snapshot of the pre-9/11 organization
led by Usama Bin Laden, the United
States still lacks the vocabulary to understand how and why terrorism
threatens. This is partly due to the impact of global counterterrorist operations (the Congressional Research
Services notes that three thousand suspected al-Qa‘ida members have been
detained by about ninety countries),
conflicting strategies within Bin Laden’s
organization (global legion of militants
or global inspiration), and the diversity
of groups that compose contemporary
depictions of al-Qa‘ida (the Egyptian
al-Jihad, the Indonesian Jemaah
Islamiyah, or the Kashmiri Haarakat
ul-Mujahidin, to name three of the
many disparate nationalist groups
lumped together with al-Qa‘ida).
Jason Burke, a chief reporter for the
London Observer who spent about four
years in Pakistan and Afghanistan, argues that al-Qa‘ida (Arabic for “the
base of operation” or “foundation”) is
an overused term and mischaracterizes
the nature of international terrorism. In
contrast to the pre-9/11 view that Bin
Laden is al-Qa‘ida, or the post–Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan)
view that al-Qa‘ida is a global coalition
of factions, Burke argues it is less an organization than an ideology. “Osama
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bin Laden did not create it nor will his
death or incarceration end it”—he has
been a “peripheral player in modern Islamic militancy.” Al-Qa‘ida is bigger
and different from Bin Laden and his
Egyptian deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The word denotes a purpose, not an
organization.
Throughout the book, Burke weaves a
personal narrative drawing from his experiences on the ground and upon a
deep understanding of international
terrorism. He argues, “contemporary
Islamic militancy is a diverse and complex historical phenomenon.” It is
driven by local political grievances, economic frustration, and government
repression.
Burke’s two-year-old assertion that
al-Qa‘ida is more of an ideology than a
group is gaining currency and is now
more widely accepted within the U.S.
government. The Defense Department
has now defined “countering ideological support for terrorism,” or CIST, as a
major component of its strategy in the
global war on terrorism. In order to win
this war, it is simply not enough to protect the homeland, neutralize terrorists,
and eliminate terrorist safe havens.
Rather, the goal is to create the conditions that prevent terrorism from becoming an international threat. As
such, the Bush administration’s efforts
to promote democracy and eliminate
tyranny are seen as the means to establish pluralism and to provide opposition
groups a nonviolent venue to express
grievances. In many authoritarian
countries today, there are few options
for peaceful regime change. Burke’s
travels and interviews led him to the
conclusion that “as national Islamic
movements, moderate or violent, are
crushed or fail, anger is channeled into

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/12

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn 2005.vp
Thursday, August 18, 2005 9:57:48 AM

BOOK REVIEWS

147

the symbolic realm and into the international, cosmic, apocalyptic language
of bin Laden and his associates.”
Burke’s work adds to the Defense Department’s effort to analyze, by deconstructing al-Qa‘ida, what motivates
radical terrorist groups and understand
why the United States is increasingly a
target. For Burke, “the world is a far
more radicalized place now than it was
prior to September 11th.” It is the freelance operators without obvious connection to any group who should worry
us the most; without a peaceful way to
resolve their perceived injustice, they
resort to violence.
The distance from 9/11, counterterrorism successes with international
partners, and the lack of additional attacks in the United States allow for a
more thoughtful debate on why the
United States is perceived negatively in
the world and how local conditions
spawn terrorist movements. For those
who are ready for the answers, Burke’s
book is a good place to start. He not
only corrects conventional misunderstandings of al-Qa‘ida but offers a good
representation of the radicalism the
United States is attempting to contain.
DEREK S. REVERON

Naval War College

Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies Choose to
Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking, 2005. 525pp.
$29.95

In his Pulitzer Prize–winning Guns,
Germs and Steel, Jared Diamond, professor of geology at UCLA, used a blend of
history, archaeology, geography, and anthropology to explain how Western civilizations rose to dominance. In Collapse,
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